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Abstract
To what extent is the observed mis-pricing in experimental asset markets caused by strategic
uncertainty (SU) and by individual bounded rationality (IBR)? We address this question by
comparing subjects initial price forecasts in two market environments – one with six human
traders, and the other with one human and five computer traders. We find that both SU and
IBR account equally for the median initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values. The
effect of SU is greater for subjects with a perfect score in the Cognitive Reflection Test, and it
is not significant for those with low scores.
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1 Introduction
To what extent are the observed price deviations from the fundamental values in experimental asset
markets (Smith et al., 1988) caused by strategic uncertainty (uncertainty about the behavior of
others) and by individual bounded rationality (or confusion)? First we describe the context in
which this question is posed.
Consider an asset with a finite life of T periods. Each unit of the asset pays a constant dividend
D at the end of each period, and becomes worthless after the final dividend payment at the end
of period T . Under these conditions, the fundamental value of a unit of the asset during period t
(t = 1, 2, ..., T ), FVt, is the sum of the remaining dividend payments, i.e., FVt = (T +1−t)D. When
these conditions are commonly known, the common knowledge of rationality implies that if rational
traders trade this asset, it will only be at its fundamental value.
Following the seminal study by Smith et al. (1988), it has been repeatedly shown for a variety
of experimental conditions and subject pools, that the market prices of assets deviate substantially
from their fundamental values in these experimental asset markets.1
Such deviations in observed prices from the fundamental values were initially considered to
result from strategic uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about others’ behavior) by Smith et al. (1988).
They noted that “what we learn from the particular experiments reported here is that a common
dividend, and common knowledge thereof, is insufficient to induce initial common expectations. As
1In the original experiment in Smith et al. (1988) as well as in many other studies, the value of the dividend
payment in each period, dt, is determined randomly from a known i.i.d. distribution. Thus, the fundamental value of
the asset is defined as FVt =
PT
p=t E(dt), where E(dt) is the expected dividend payment. Porter and Smith (1995)
eliminated the uncertainty about dividend payments in investigating the effect of varying degrees of risk aversion
among subjects. No significant difference was found in the observed pattern of mis-pricing in the experiments with
uncertain dividend payments. While most of the studies, including Smith et al. (1988), considered continuous double
auction markets, van Boening et al. (1993) and Haruvy et al. (2007) considered call markets. They reported that
prices deviate substantially from the fundamental values in call markets as well. King et al. (1993) investigated the
effects of short-selling, margin-buying, equal endowment, and circuit breakers. They also conducted experiments with
corporate executives and stock market dealers to see the effect of different subject pools. “Bubbles” and “crashes”
were observed in most of their experiments, except in those where transaction fees were introduced or where subjects
had experienced the same market conditions twice. Haruvy and Noussair (2006) showed that allowing short-selling
can cause prices to deviate substantially below the fundamental values. Noussair et al. (2001) reported bubbles in
markets with a constant fundamental price, i.e., the expected value of the dividend per period is zero and an asset is
converted into a fixed sum of money at the end of the final trading period. Dufwenberg et al. (2005) mixed experienced
and inexperienced subjects to investigate whether the presence of inexperienced subjects among experienced subjects
induced greater price deviation. They showed that the presence of two (respectively four) inexperienced subjects in a
market with four (resp. two) experienced subjects (who had experienced the same market three times) did not produce
larger price deviations than in a market with six twice-experienced subjects. Hussam et al. (2008) investigated whether
(twice) experienced subjects, when facing a new market environment with a large variance in dividend payments and
higher initial cash holdings, would avoid creating bubbles. The answer was negative, and therefore, learning to trade
close to the fundamental values in one market condition does not carry over to a different market condition. Deck et al.
(2011) considered overlapping generations of traders to study the effect of the arrival of inexperienced traders and the
departure of experienced traders. They found that bubbles form when inexperienced traders arrive and bring liquidity
to the market, and that crashes occur when experienced traders leave and withdraw liquidity from the market. See
Sto¨ckl et al. (2010) and the references therein for details of other experiments.
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we interpret it, this is due to agent uncertainty about the behavior of others” (Smith et al., 1988,
p.1148).
An implication of this, is what Lei et al. (2001) called a “speculative hypothesis.” That is,
“traders are uncertain that future prices will track the fundamental value, because they doubt the
rationality of the other traders, and therefore speculate in the belief that there are opportunities for
future capital gains” (Lei et al., 2001, p.832). Such speculation results in observed price deviations
from the fundamental values. Lei et al. (2001) tested the “speculative hypothesis” by performing a set
of experiments in which capital gains were not possible because resale of the assets was prohibited.
Based on the observed deviations of prices from the fundamental values even in the absence of
capital gain possibilities, Lei et al. (2001) rejected the speculative hypothesis and noted that “the
hypothesis that the traders are rational, and that the bubble is due to the fact that this rationality
is not common knowledge, cannot be the whole story behind the bubbles” (p. 857). Instead, they
suggested the “active participation hypothesis,” i.e., subjects in these experiments who are trained
to engage in trading simply want to trade (even if such trading results in making losses) because
there are no other activities available to them during the experiment.
In two recent papers, Huber and Kirchler (2012) and Kirchler et al. (2012) suggested that these
bubbles are mainly due to subjects being confused about the nature of declining fundamental values
of the asset in the experiment. Kirchler et al. (2012) also showed that mis-pricing due to confusion
is further fueled by increasing the amount of cash relative to the number of assets available in the
market as a result of dividend payments during the experiment.2
These studies showed that the magnitude of mis-pricing, that is, the deviation of prices from the
fundamental values, becomes much smaller if in the instructions, a figure of declining fundamental
values is presented to the subjects, rather than a table containing the same information (Huber and
Kirchler, 2012), or if the word “stock” (the value of which many subjects assume does not decline
constantly) is explained as “stocks of a depletable gold mine” (Kirchler et al., 2012).
Is it just confusion (i.e., subjects not understanding the declining fundamental value in these
experiments that is not natural in real markets) that is causing the mis-pricing? It would be quite
surprising, however, if all the subjects in the experiments were equally confused given the widely
reported heterogeneity in the depth of strategic thinking among subjects in laboratory experiments
2This conclusion is in contrast with an earlier study by Noussair et al. (2001) that showed substantial mis-pricing
under a constant fundamental value.
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(Nagel, 1995; Ho et al., 1998; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006).3 In addition, several studies have
demonstrated, both theoretically (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989) and experimentally (Fehr
and Tyran, 2008; Sutan and Willinger, 2009; Heemeijer et al., 2009; Bao et al., 2012), that such
heterogeneity can manifest as a large deviation from the equilibrium in the presence of positive
feedback.4 Because it is very likely that positive feedback exists in asset markets, confusion or
bounded rational behavior of a few subjects in the market can be amplified owing to strategic
responses by more sophisticated subjects. This consideration leads us to our main question: to
what extent is mis-pricing caused by confusion (or some kind of individual bounded rationality) and
strategic uncertainty? The above mentioned studies do not investigate these questions, and thus the
relevance of strategic uncertainty in these experiments remains an open question.
In this paper, we address this open question by eliminating strategic uncertainty as far as possible
by introducing computer traders, and quantify the potential impact of strategic uncertainty as well
as individual bounded rationality (or confusion) on these asset market experiments. That is, we
consider two types of markets (treatments) consisting of six traders: one human and five computers
(1H5C), and six humans (6H). Our computer traders follow the equilibrium strategy (under the
usual set of assumptions of profit maximization and the common knowledge of rationality). All
subjects are informed of which treatment they are involved in, and those in 1H5C are clearly told
how computer traders behave. Therefore, in the 1H5C treatment, the single human trader does not
face any strategic uncertainty. Let us mention a couple of additional design aspects before discussing
how our experimental design allows us to achieve our objective.
To facilitate the introduction of computer traders, we employ a call market rule similar to those
used by van Boening et al. (1993) and Haruvy et al. (2007) rather than the continuous double
auction employed by Smith et al. (1988) and in various other studies.5 In a call market, traders
submit buy (sell) orders by specifying the maximum (minimum) price they are willing to pay (accept)
for a unit of asset in each period. This means that our computer traders, in each period, submit
their buy orders (sell orders) by specifying the fundamental value of the asset in that period as the
3The theoretical developments that followed these experimental findings suggest that considering interaction among
heterogeneous boundedly rational agents helps us to better understand experimental outcomes. See Camerer (2003,
Ch.5) and Crawford et al. (2013) for further details.
4These experimental analyses considered different games; Fehr and Tyran (2008) and Sutan and Willinger (2009)
considered price setting and beauty contest games, while Heemeijer et al. (2009) and Bao et al. (2012) investigated
price forecasting games. What these studies also showed is that in the presence of strategic substitution (or negative
feedback), the observed outcomes are much closer to the Nash or rational expectation equilibrium.
5van Boening et al. (1993) and Haruvy et al. (2007) reported that prices deviate substantially from the fundamental
values in call markets as well.
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maximum (minimum) price they are willing to pay (accept) for a unit of asset. Once all the traders
in the market have submitted their orders, the price that clears the market is calculated, and all
transactions take place at that price among traders who submitted a maximum buying price no less
than, or a minimum selling price no greater than, the market clearing price.
Note, however, that because of the way computer traders behave, the market prices in 1H5C
follow the fundamental values very closely. Thus, comparing the realized market prices for the two
treatments, 6H and 1H5C, is not very informative for our purposes. Therefore, we elicit subjects’
expectations about future prices as in Haruvy et al. (2007). It has been shown that expected future
prices deviate quite substantially from the fundamental values in all human markets (Haruvy et al.,
2007, Fig.3, p.1909), and that the deviations disappear gradually as subjects gain more experience
from trading under the same market conditions. This is similar to what is observed from the
realized prices. Thus, our focus on price forecasts is informative for studying the cause of realized
price deviations.
How then does our design allow us to achieve our objective; that is, to identify the effect of
strategic uncertainty as well as individual bounded rationality (or confusion) in asset market exper-
iments? Let us imagine a rational human trader. In the 1H5C treatment, s/he does not face any
uncertainty regarding the behavior of the other traders in the market. And given the behavior of the
computer traders, s/he will expect that the prices follow the fundamental values. Therefore, if we
observe any deviation from this expectation in our data, it must be due to some kind of individual
bounded rationality (or confusion). On the contrary, in the 6H treatment, the rational human trader
is unsure about the behavior of the other traders in the market and can expect a variety of outcomes.
Of course, we should not eliminate the possibility that subjects are confused or boundedly rational.
Thus, the observed deviations of price forecasts from the fundamental values in the 6H treatment are
due to both strategic uncertainty and individual bounded rationality. A comparison of the subjects’
price expectations in the 1H5C and 6H treatments, therefore, gives us a direct measure of the extent
to which strategic uncertainty explains the deviation of price forecasts from the fundamental values.
Several experiments have introduced computer agents that follow equilibrium behavior in labora-
tory experiments to reduce strategic uncertainty. Cason and Friedman (1997), in their experiments
on price formation in a simple market institution,6 introduced robot traders that follow a Bayesian-
6Cason and Friedman (1997) do not consider markets for assets with a life of several periods as we do in this paper.
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Nash equilibrium strategy to facilitate learning by human subjects.7 Fehr and Tyran (2001) in-
troduced robots that utilize a Nash equilibrium strategy in their investigation of nominal (money)
illusion to decompose the reasons for non-immediate adjustment against negative nominal shocks
into (i) those arising from individual irrationality, and (ii) those due to a lack of common knowledge
of rationality.8 They reported that both individual irrationality (or bounded rationality) and the
lack of common knowledge of rationality (or strategic uncertainty) account equally for the failure of
immediate adjustment to the new equilibrium after a negative nominal shock in the game.9
Our experimental results suggest that strategic uncertainty accounts for about 50% of the median
initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values; the remaining 50% is due to bounded ratio-
nality. Therefore, it is not just confusion that causes mis-pricing in an experimental asset market;
strategic uncertainty also plays an important role. To further investigate the effect of heterogene-
ity among subjects, we categorized subjects based on their scores in the Cognitive Reflection Test
(Frederick, 2005, CRT) and analyzed the data separately based on the CRT scores. We found that
the effect of strategic uncertainty is much larger (about 70% of the median initial forecasts deviation
from the fundamental values) for those with a perfect CRT score. For those with very low CRT
scores, on the other hand, no significant effect of strategic uncertainty was observed.
Our finding complements the recent finding by Cheung et al. (2012). They investigated the effect
of uncertainty regarding how others understood the nature of fundamental values in asset markets
by (1) training subjects extensively on the nature of fundamental values, and (2) manipulating the
subjects knowledge about whether all the other players in the same market have undergone the same
extensive training. The latter manipulation is done by implementing the following two treatments:
(a) everyone in the room is trained and they are all told that everyone in the room is trained, and
(b) training only half of the subjects in the room and telling everyone that not everyone in the
7It should be noted that when human subjects play against other human subjects who are also learning, the
learning process can be very slow. In addition to robots that follow the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy (BNE
robots), Cason and Friedman (1997) also introduced “revealing robots” whose behavior is different from BNE robots,
to investigate whether the convergence to equilibrium is due to human subjects mimicking the behavior of the BNE
robots or to their best response against the BNE robots. Their results suggest the latter.
8Fehr and Tyran (2001) considered price-setting games and varied two aspects of the game: (a) whether negative
nominal shocks are present, and (b) whether a human subject plays the game with other human subjects or with
rational computer programs that assume all the players are rational. This two-by-two design allowed them to achieve
the objective of the experiments. This is also discussed quite extensively in Fehr and Tyran (2005).
9In addition to rational robots that follow the equilibrium strategy, Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) introduced
boundedly rational robots that follow Level-1,2,3 or Dominance 1,2 strategies in their experiments on a two-person
guessing game to better analyze the responses of human subjects who were informed about the behavioral rules of
various opponents. In a different strand of the literature, computer agents were introduced to investigate whether
deviations of observed behavior from the equilibrium prediction are due to bounded rationality (confusion) or kindness
in games such as an alternative offer bargaining game (Johnson et al., 2002) or public good games (Houser and
Kurzban, 2002). These studies identified substantial impact of bounded rationality.
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room is trained. In (b), however, the subjects are not told that groups are created in such a way
that either all the subjects in a group are trained or none of them is. Treatment (b) makes trained
subjects believe that not all the other subjects in their group understand the declining nature of
fundamental values when, in fact, their group consists only of trained subjects. The authors found
that the magnitude of mis-pricing is substantially smaller when all the subjects are trained and know
that they are all trained than the case in which subjects are trained but do not know that they are
all trained. They also reported that, in the latter case, the mis-pricing is as great as in the case
where training is absent. Based on these results, Cheung et al. (2012) concluded that individual
confusion alone cannot account for the observed mis-pricing, but that uncertainty about how well
others understand the nature of fundamental values can. An interesting question is how the effect
of strategic uncertainty we have identified via price forecasts (which accounts for about 50% of the
median deviation) is amplified so much that it accounts for most of the price deviations as reported
by Cheung et al. (2012). Unfortunately, our experiment does not address this question and it is left
for future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is discussed in detail in
Section 2. Section 3 presents the results of our experiments, and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Experimental design
We set up an experimental call asset market consisting of six traders, who were either human
subjects or computer programs, and considered two treatments. In the first, referred to as the 6H
treatment, all six traders were human subjects. In the other, referred to as the 1H5C treatment,
only one of the six traders was a human subject, and the other five traders were computer traders
who submitted orders at the fundamental values. In each treatment, subjects were told explicitly
about the composition of the six traders in the market in which they were participating. Moreover,
in the 1H5C treatment, subjects were also informed about the behavior of the computer traders.
Our main focus was to compare the data for these two treatments to separate the effect of strategic
uncertainty and individual bounded rationality.
In each market, traders can trade an asset with a life of ten periods. Initially, all traders were
endowed with 4 units of asset and 520 experimental currency units (ECUs, which we called Marks).
Subjects were also asked to submit their expectations regarding the future prices of a unit of the
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asset. We first describe the trading rule employed, and then proceed to explain how subjects’
expectations about future prices were elicited.
We used a call market rule similar to that in Haruvy et al. (2007). In each period, each trader
can submit at most one buy order and one sell order.10 An order consists of a pair of values: a price
and a quantity. When submitting a buy order, a trader must specify the maximum price, PD, at
which s/he is willing to buy a unit of asset, and the maximum quantity, QD, s/he is willing to buy.
In the same manner, when submitting a sell order, a trader must specify the minimum price, PS, at
which s/he is willing to sell a unit of asset, and the maximum quantity, QS, s/he is willing to sell.
We attached three constraints: the admissible price range, a budget constraint, and the relationship
between PD and PS in the case that a subject submits both buy and sell orders. The admissible
price range is set so that, when QD ≥ 1 (QS ≥ 1), PD (PS) must be an integer between 1 and
2000, i.e., PD ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2000} (PS ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2000}). The budget constraint simply means that
neither borrowing of cash nor short-selling of an asset is allowed.11 The final constraint is such that
when a trader is submitting both buy and sell orders, i.e., QD ≥ 1 and QS ≥ 1, the maximum
buying price must not be greater than the minimum selling price, i.e., PS ≥ PD. Once all the
traders in the market have submitted their orders, the price that clears the market is calculated,12
and all transactions are processed at that price among traders who submitted a maximum buying
price no less than, or a minimum selling price no greater than, the market clearing price.13
At the end of each period, for each unit of the asset 12 ECUs is paid as a dividend. We selected
a fixed dividend payment, instead of a stochastic dividend as commonly considered in the literature,
to eliminate all uncertainty other than strategic uncertainty from the experiment.14 The dividend
can be used to purchase the asset in subsequent periods. After the final dividend is paid at the end
of period 10, the asset has no value. Other than this stream of dividend payments, the asset has
no intrinsic value. Thus, the fundamental value of a unit of asset at the beginning of period t is
FVt = 12 × (11 − t). We distributed a table showing the sum of the remaining dividends after the
10Of course, a trader can choose not to submit any orders by specifying zero as the quantities to buy and sell. We
imposed a 60 second, non-binding, time limit for submitting orders. When the time limit was reached, the subjects
were simply informed, though a flashing message in the upper right corner of their screen, to submit their orders as
soon as possible.
11Thus, the budget constraint implies (i) QD × PD ≤ cash holding at the beginning of the period, and (ii) QS ≤
units of asset on hand at the beginning of the period.
12When there are several such prices, the lowest one is chosen as the market clearing price. This is important to
ensure the price does not jump up in the absence of transactions at the market clearing price.
13Any ties among the last accepted buy or sell orders are resolved randomly. It is possible that no transaction will
take place given the computed market clearing price.
14Eliminating uncertainty about dividend payments did not significantly lower the magnitude of price deviations
from the fundamental values according to the study by Porter and Smith (1995).
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dividend for each period has been paid out, a value we called the “next value” in the experiment.
Thus, subjects had a table showing FVt for t = 1, 2, ..., 10 and could refer to it any time during the
experiment. This table is given in the Appendix A.
After the explanation of the setup of the call market, as well as the table of fundamental values
(called “next value” in the experiment), subjects in the 1H5C treatment were told the following
about the behavior of computer traders: “In each period, each computer trader places buy and sell
orders by setting both the maximum price it is willing to pay and the minimum price at which it is
willing to accept to the next value at the beginning of the period.” Thus, subjects were informed
about the exact trading strategy employed by the computer traders.
Next we explain how expectations about future prices were elicited. At the beginning of each
period, subjects were asked to submit their price forecasts for all the remaining periods in the
market.15 That is, in period t, each subject submitted 10 − t + 1 forecasts.16 Therefore, subjects
submitted a total of 55 price forecasts over the 10 periods. Subjects were informed that they would
receive the following bonus payment based on how accurate their forecast prices were:
Bonus (in ECUs) =0.5%× (number of forecasts that were within ± 10 % of the actual market price)
× final cash holding in period 10.
Therefore, if all 55 forecasts were within 10% of the realized prices, the subject would receive 27.5%
of his/her final cash holding as a bonus payment. This incentive scheme for accurate forecasts
was chosen to reduce subjects’ incentive to influence the prices to move closer to their forecasts by
making losses.17 When submitting price forecasts, all previous market clearing prices are shown on
the screen. Our design is closely related to that used by Haruvy et al. (2007), who showed substantial
deviations of both realized price and price forecasts from the fundamental values. The call market
15Although this was not stated explicitly in the instructions, each price forecast takes the form of an integer value
between 0 and 2000. We set this range to match the admissible values of orders. If subjects tried to submit a value
outside this range, an error message stating that the forecast must be in the above range would be displayed on their
computer terminal.
16We imposed a 120 second, non-binding, time limit for submitting price forecasts. When the time limit was
reached, the subjects were simply told, through a message flashing in the upper right corner of their screen, to submit
their forecasts as soon as possible.
17As noted by Haruvy et al. (2007), there is a trade-off between an incentive for accurate transactions and an
incentive for maximizing profit from trading. In other words, because we ask subjects to submit their forecasts before
submitting their order, it is possible that if the incentive for accurate forecasts is too great, subjects may submit
potentially loss-making orders to influence the prices to be closer to their forecasts. In our design, since the bonus for
accurate forecasts is a fraction of the final cash holding, this incentive is reduced. It is, of course, best to have both
accurate forecasts and high profit from trading.
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rule has several advantages: (i) the prices subjects have to forecast are clear, (2) learning based on
observing orders submitted by other traders within a period is not possible, and (3) it is easier to
introduce computer traders because all orders are submitted simultaneously.
As the end of each period, subjects were informed about the market clearing price for the period,
the units of asset they have traded,18 their cash and asset holdings, the number of price forecasts
that were within 10% of the actual market prices up to that period, and the next value of a unit of
the asset.19
As noted above, each trader was given an endowment of 520 ECUs of cash and four units of
the asset before the market opened in period 1. The same group of traders, with identical initial
endowments of cash and assets, repeated the same 10-period market three times as one experiment.
We call a 10-period market a round. Thus, the experiment consisted of 3 rounds of a 10-period
market with identical initial endowments and the same group of subjects. The purpose of repeating
the round three times was to compare how quickly the price forecasts and the market clearing prices
converge to the fundamental values.20
At the end of the experiment (after participating in 3 rounds of the 10-period market), subjects
were paid in cash the sum of their final cash holdings (including the bonus payment for accurately
predicting future market prices) for each round plus a participation fee of 500 yen. We used an
exchange rate between ECUs and Japanese yen of 1 ECU = 1 Japanese yen. The experiment
lasted about two and a half hours including the explanation of the instructions and completion of a
questionnaire after the experiment.21 The questionnaire consisted of the Cognitive Reflection Test
(Frederick, 2005). Subjects earned on average about 4000 yen.
3 Results
A series of computerized experiments were conducted at the University of Tsukuba between May
and July 2013.22 173 subjects who had never participated in a similar experiment were recruited
18In the presentation of this information, a positive (resp. negative) number denotes that they had bought (resp.
sold) a certain number of units of asset.
19The next value of an asset at the end of period t is 12× (10− t).
20Before entering round 1, there was a practice period to allow subjects to familiarize themselves with the user
interface of the software. Subjects were given their initial endowment of cash and assets, and asked to enter their
price forecasts for the 10 periods and their orders for period 1. Information regarding the resulting market clearing
price and so on were not shown to the subjects.
21See Appendix B to obtain the English translation of the instructions.
22The experiments were implemented using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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Treatment Dates No. of subjects
6H May 25, 2013 24
6H June 1, 2013 24
6H June 15, 2013 24
1H5C May 26, 2013 25
1H5C June 2, 2013 25
1H5C July 7, 2013 51
Table 1: Summary of experimental sessions
from across the campus via e-mails and flyers.23 Table 1 summarizes the details of the experimental
sessions.
We begin our discussion by presenting the results of our main analysis: initial deviation of price
expectations from fundamental values. We then move on to discuss the realized prices and the
dynamics of forecasts deviations. We also discuss the orders submitted by subjects.24
3.1 Deviations of forecasts
In each period, subjects forecast prices for all the remaining periods within the round. To better
summarize the magnitude of forecast deviations from the fundamental values for each subject, we
introduce two measures of forecast deviations based on the measures of price deviations from the
fundamental values: the relative absolute deviation (RAD) and the relative deviation (RD), proposed
by Sto¨ckl et al. (2010).
For subject i, the magnitudes of the deviations of the forecasts submitted in period t of round r
from the fundamental values are measured as the relative absolute forecast deviation (RAFDit,r)
and relative forecast deviation (RFDit,r) defined as:
RAFDit,r =
1
T − t+ 1
T∑
p=t
|f it,p,r − FVp|
|FV |
23Subjects had to register on our database before the experiment. We confirmed their lack of participation in past
experiments by checking their names, student ID numbers, and e-mail addresses.
24 After conducting an in-depth analysis of the data for 1H5C from the May 26th and June 2nd sessions, we realized
that there was an error in a parameter value affecting how subjects were grouped in these sessions. As a result of the
error, subjects in these 1H5C sessions were in groups of 4 (or 3) humans and 20 (or 15) computer traders, and not 1
human and 5 computers as intended. We ran an additional session on July 7th for 1H5C with the correct grouping.
While this error should not have any effect on the initial forecasts (because the instructions were identical), it could
affect the outcome once subjects had submitted their orders and prices were realized. For our analysis of the initial
forecasts deviation, we decided to pool the data from the May 26th, June 2nd, and July 7th sessions, providing a
larger number of observations. However, in our analysis of prices, subsequent forecasts, and orders submitted by
subjects, we discarded the data for 1H5C from the sessions on May 26th and June 2nd, and used only data from the
session on July 7th. An analysis of the initial forecasts deviation by discarding the data from the sessions on May
26th and June 2nd is given in the Appendix C for completeness.
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Figure 1: Distributions of RAFD1,1 and RFD1,1 (period 1, round 1) for 1H5C (dashed line, N=101)
and 6H (solid line, N=72). In all the figures given below, p-values are given for a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) 2-tailed test as well as a Mann-Whitney (MW) 2-tailed test.
RFDit,r =
1
T − t+ 1
T∑
p=t
f it,p,r − FVp
|FV | ,
where T is the number of periods (T = 10 in our experiments), f it,p,r is the forecast of the asset
price in period p submitted by subject i in period t of round r, FVp is the fundamental value of
the asset in period p, and |FV | is the absolute value of the average fundamental value of the asset
over all periods.25 The only difference between RAFD and RFD is the numerator. The former
uses absolute values, while the latter does not. As noted by Sto¨ckl et al. (2010), these two measures
are complementary in that, whereas RAFD shows the magnitude of the forecast deviations, RFD
shows the direction of these deviations.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of the two measures of initial forecasts deviation, RAFDi1,1
(left) and RFDi1,1 (right), for 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C (dashed lines). The observed distributions
as well as the median values of RAFDi1,1 and RFDi1,1 for the two treatments differ significantly as
shown in the figure.
Recall that the effect of individual bounded rationality (or confusion) is measured by the forecast
deviations from the fundamental values in the 1H5C treatments. And the effect of strategic uncer-
tainty is measured as the difference between the forecast deviations for the 1H5C and 6H treatments.
Since the median RAFD1,1 values are 0.583 for 6H and 0.315 for 1H5C, about 54% (=0.315/0.583)
of the median initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values is due to individual bounded
25We omit subscript r for FVp, |FV |, and T because these values remain constant across all three rounds of our
experiment. One could also consider normalizing the measure using the average fundamental value of the asset over
the remaining periods after period t. We avoid this to keep the denominator constant for all t.
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rationality, while the remaining 46% (0.268/0.583) is due to strategic uncertainty.26
3.2 Cognitive ability and strategic uncertainty
We have identified a significant effect of strategic uncertainty based on the price forecasts submitted
at the beginning of round 1 in each experiment. While the identified effect of strategic uncertainty is
large, it is not as large as the effect of individual bounded rationality. If subjects are heterogeneous
in terms of their depth of strategic thinking or cognitive ability, one may wish to investigate beyond
the median effect, because it is possible that some subjects make random forecasts without thinking
much about the experimental environment (especially at the beginning of the experiment) while
others reflect upon the instructions and make more careful forecasts. If this is the case, we should
not observe a significant effect of strategic uncertainty in the former group of subjects, while we
should in the latter group of subjects.
To gather information about the cognitive ability of the subjects, we implemented the Cognitive
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005, CRT) as part of the questionnaire at the end of the experiment.
This test consists of the following three simple questions, structured in such a way that intuitive or
“impulsive” (Frederick, 2005, p. 26) answers are incorrect:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost? cents.27
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? minutes.
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the
lake? days.
In all three questions, some cognitive reflection is necessary to overcome impulse and arrive at the
correct answers. The score of this test, computed simply as the number of correct answers to these
26Akiyama et al. (2012) reported the results of a comparison of a market with a single human and five computer
traders and that with all human traders when everyone is told that “Each computer trader assumes that all traders
maximize their profits without making any mistakes. Given this assumption about the others, the computer trader
maximizes its profits without making mistakes. If the computer trader is indifferent between trading and not trading,
it prefers to trade.” Akiyama et al. (2012) failed to reject the null hypothesis that distributions of initial (period
1, round 1) forecast deviations from the fundamental values in two treatments are drawn from the same underlying
distribution. The difference between the finding reported in the current paper and that by Akiyama et al. (2012)
indicates that subjects have difficulty inferring the behavior of profit maximizing computers.
27In translating this question into Japanese, we changed $1.10 and $1.00 to 11,000 and 10,000 yen, respectively.
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Treatment N CRTS=0 CRTS=1 CRTS=2 CRTS=3
6H 72 8 17 26 21
1H5C 101 8 19 26 48
Table 2: CRT scores
Distributions of RAFD1,1
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Figure 2: Distributions of RAFD1,1 (top) and RFD1,1 (bottom) in 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C
(dashed lines) for subjects with CRT score 0 or 1 (left), CRT score 2 (middle), and CRT score 3
(right).
three questions, has been shown to correlate negatively with lower incidences of the conjunction
fallacy and conservatism in updating probabilities (Oechssler et al., 2009). On the other hand, those
with higher CRT scores tend to choose numbers closer to the Nash equilibrium in beauty contest
games (Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2012). Corgnet et al. (2013), in their investigation of the effect of “house
money” on the magnitude of price deviations, reported that subjects with low CRT scores tend to
buy (sell) an asset at prices above (below) fundamental values while the opposite is true for those
with high CRT scores. Here we are interested in the correlation between the CRT score and the
magnitude of the initial forecasts deviation. Table 2 shows the frequencies of subjects with various
CRT scores in each treatment. The average score of the 173 subjects is 2.01. Since the number of
subjects with a CRT score equal to 0 is small, we included them in the group with a CRT score of
1 in our analysis.
Figure 2 shows the distributions of RAFD1,1 (top) and RFD1,1 (bottom) in the 6H (solid
14
lines) and 1H5C (dashed lines) treatments for subjects with CRT score 0 or 1 (left), CRT score 2
(middle), and CRT score 3 (right). While the distributions of RAFD1,1 in the two treatments are
not significantly different for subjects with CRT score 0 or 1 and 2, they are significantly different
for subjects with CRT score 3.28 For those with CRT score 3, the median RAFD1,1 values are 0.570
in 6H and 0.183 in 1H5C. Thus, about 32% (0.183/0.570) of the median initial forecasts deviation
stems from individual bounded rationality and the remaining 68% is due to strategic uncertainty.
Compared with the result based on all the data, the effect of strategic uncertainty is much more
pronounced for those with a perfect CRT score. For those with CRT scores 0 or 1, on the other
hand, no significant effect of strategic uncertainty was found.
In the bottom-left and bottom-middle panels of Figure 2, the dashed curves (that is, the results
for 1H5C) lie to the left of the solid curves (the results for 6H), although the two distributions
of RFD1,1 for those subjects with CRT scores 0 or 1 are not significantly different.29 For those
with a perfect CRT score (bottom-right panel), this is not the case. The forecasts of these subjects
participating in the 1H5C market were closer to the fundamental values than those of subjects
participating in the 6H market.
It is quite clear from Figure 2 that the magnitude of RAFD in the 1H5C treatment is much
smaller for subjects with higher CRT scores than those with lower CRT scores. Thus, CRT score
is clearly related to the degree of bounded rationality that we identified through the magnitude of
forecast deviations from the fundamental values (RAFD) in the 1H5C treatment. On the other
hand, the magnitude of RAFD in the 6H treatment does not seem to vary across subjects with
varying CRT scores.
This is confirmed by Figure 3, which shows the distributions of RAFD1,1 for subjects with CRT
score 3 (solid lines) and those with CRT score 1 or 0 (dashed lines) in the 6H (left) and 1H5C (right)
treatments. We omitted subjects with CRT score equal to 2 to focus on the two extreme groups.
The distributions of RAFD1,1 for the two groups of subjects basically lie on top of each other, except
for those with very high RAFD, and are not significantly different in the 6H treatment. On the
other hand, the two distributions are quite different in the 1H5C treatment, although this difference
is not statistically significant.30
28P -values are reported in the figure.
29For those with CRT score 2, the median RFD1,1 values are marginally significantly different.
30The distributions of RFD1,1 for subjects with CRT score less than 1 and CRT score 3 are not statistically different
in either the 6H (p-value = 0.469 (KS) and 0.427 (MW), both 2-tailed tests) or 1H5C treatment (p-value = 0.457
(KS) and 0.539 (MW), both 2-tailed tests).
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Figure 3: Distributions of RAFD1,1 for subjects with CRT score 3 (solid lines) and those with CRT
score 1 or less (dashed lines) in 6H (left) and 1H5C (right).
The insignificant difference between the two distributions of RAFD1,1 in the 6H treatment31
shows that the total initial effects of bounded rationality and strategic uncertainty are not signifi-
cantly different for these two groups of subjects. As shown above, whereas for subjects with CRT
0 or 1, it is mainly individual bounded rationality that explains the initial deviation of price fore-
casts from the fundamental values, for subjects with CRT score 3, the effect of strategic uncertainty
accounts for more than half of the initial forecasts deviation.
3.3 Dynamics: prices and forecasts
So far, we have only considered the forecasts submitted before subjects observed any prices. In
what way did subjects change their forecasts after observing the realized prices? To address this
question, we first summarize the realized price data and then move on to the dynamics of forecast
deviations.32
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the realized prices in the three rounds in 6H (top) and 1H5C
(bottom). As expected the prices in the 1H5C treatment follow the fundamental values except for
a few rare cases in which the human subject dominates one side of the market by placing a large
quantity of a buy order at a price above the fundamental value (period 9 in round 2 and period 10
in round 3). In the 6H treatment, on the other hand, prices deviate from the fundamental values
in round 1. Such deviations of prices from the fundamental values gradually disappear in rounds 2
and 3 as subjects gain experience from trading in the same group as reported in the literature.
31If anything, the distribution of RAFD1,1 for subjects with CRT score 3 lies to the right of that for subjects with
CRT scores 1 or 0.
32As noted in footnote 24 above, we only used the data from July 7th for the 1H5C treatment.
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Dynamics of prices in 6H (12 groups)
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Dynamics of prices in 1H5C (51 groups)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
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Figure 4: Dynamics of realized prices in 6H (top) and 1H5C (bottom) for three rounds.
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Figure 5: Distributions of RAD (left) and RD (right) in the 6H treatments for round 1 (thick solid
lines), round 2 (dashed lines), and round 3 (thin solid lines).
Figure 5 shows the distributions of the two measures of price deviations from the fundamental
values, the relative absolute deviation (RAD) and the relative deviation (RD), proposed by Sto¨ckl
et al. (2010) for three rounds of 6H treatments. For group g in round r, these two measures are
defined as follows:
RADgr ≡
1
T
T∑
p=1
|P gp,r − FVp|
|FV |
RDgr ≡
1
T
T∑
p=1
P gp,r − FVp
|FV |
where P gp,r is the realized price for group g in period p of round r and the other terms are the same
as those used in defining RAFD and RFD.
The left panel of the figure clearly shows that the magnitude of mis-pricing (measured by RAD)
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Figure 6: Dynamics of the median RAFDt,r (left), and distributions of RAFDi1,r+1 (middle) and
RFDi1,r+1 (right) in period 1 of the next round for 1H5C (dashed lines) and 6H (solid lines) in round
1 (top) and round 2 (bottom). The p-values are given for 2-tailed KS and MW tests. In conducting
the statistical tests, for 6H we take the mean RAFD and RFD values for the six traders in the
same group and use these as independent observations.
diminishes in later rounds.33 One can also see from the distribution of RD (shown in the right
panel) that most of the large price deviations from the fundamental values are on the positive side.
In other words, there is much more over-pricing than under-pricing.
Now we turn to the dynamics of the forecasts deviation. Did subjects in 1H5C learn to forecast
prices to follow the fundamental values? How about the subjects in 6H? The left panel of Figure 6
shows the dynamics of the median RAFDt,r over 10 periods in rounds 1 (top) and 2 (bottom). It
is clear that the subjects in 1H5C (dashed lines) learnt much more quickly than those in 6H (solid
lines) to forecast prices that follow the fundamental values. As can be seen in the middle panel
of the figure, by the beginning of round 2 (3), close to 80 % (90%) of the subjects in the 1H5C
treatment (dashed lines) learnt to forecast prices to follow the fundamental values, whereas this is
not the case for subjects in the 6H treatment (solid lines). These differences are quite natural given
the differences in the realized prices in the two treatments. While subjects in the 1H5C treatment
see that the price is exactly the same as the fundamental value in every period, those in the 6H
33The difference between the RAD of two consecutive rounds, ∆RADgr,r+1 ≡ RADgr − RADgr+1, is significantly
different from zero both between rounds 1 and 2 (p-value = 0.003, signed-rank (SR) two-tailed test) and between
rounds 2 and 3 (p-value = 0.007, SR two-tailed test.)
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treatment see the prices deviate from the fundamental values, as shown in Figure 4. Comparing
RFD1,1 (round 1) and RFD1,2 (round 2) shown in the rightmost panels of Figure 10 and Figure 6,
respectively, we also note that fewer subjects submit forecasts that are below the fundamental values
in later rounds in both treatments.
3.4 Submitted orders
We have seen that the median initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values are significantly
smaller in 1H5C than in 6H, i.e., the observed forecasts deviations are significantly smaller in the
absence of strategic uncertainty. We have also shown that the differences in the initial forecasts
deviation between the two treatments correlate positively with the CRT scores. While we did not
find any significant effect of strategic uncertainty for those subjects with low CRT scores, we observed
a significant effect of strategic uncertainty for those with a perfect CRT score. In addition, we have
seen that as subjects gain experience trading in the same market environment, they learn to trade
at prices closer to the fundamental values and also to forecast prices that follow the fundamental
values more closely.
We now ask some different questions. Did subjects in the 1H5C and 6H treatments behave
differently in terms of the orders they submitted? Is there a significant difference between orders
submitted by subjects with high and low CRT scores?34 This is important because the market
prices follow the fundamental values in the 1H5C treatment regardless of the orders submitted by
the subjects, except in a few rare cases in which a human subject dominates one side of the market
as we have seen above. This is due to the call market structure we have employed. In continuous
double auctions, on the other hand, if a subject submits a buy order above, or a sell order below,
the fundamental value of the current period, it will be executed at those prices as computer traders
respond quickly because they are constantly looking out for such profit making opportunities.
In this subsection, we first consider potentially loss making orders, i.e., buy orders at prices
above and sell orders at prices below the fundamental value of the period submitted by subjects
without taking their price forecasts into account.35 This is to quantify the deviation of subjects’
trading behavior (orders) from the equilibrium one. It should be noted that subjects may “rationally”
34As noted in footnote 24 we only used the data from July 7th for 1H5C. There were 51 subjects in 1H5C. See the
Appendix for the CRT scores for these 51 subjects.
35As noted above, this may not result in any losses in our experiment because the actual trading prices can differ
from those submitted by the subjects.
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deviate from the equilibrium behavior in the 6H treatment because of strategic uncertainty. To allow
for such possibilities, we then move on to incorporate subjects’ price forecasts into the analysis.
As before, let f it,p,r represent the forecast period p asset price submitted by subject i at the
beginning of period t in round r. Let pdit,r and psit,r be the maximum price at which i is willing to
buy and the minimum price at which i is willing to sell an asset, respectively, specified in subject
i’s orders submitted in period t of round r. Let dit,r and sit,r be the maximum quantity demanded
and supplied associated with pdit,r and psit,r, respectively.
We define the potential losses, normalized by the value of the initial endowments (1000 ECUs,
consisting of 4 units of the asset and 520 ECUs in cash), for subject i in round r as:
PLir ≡
1
1000
∑
t
(
dit,r max(pd
i
t,r − FVt, 0) + sit,r max(FVt − psit,r, 0)
)
.
Here we are considering buy prices that are above and sell prices that are below the fundamental
values of the asset in each period.
As noted above, “potential losses” simply captures the magnitude of the deviation (in one di-
rection) of orders from the equilibrium behavior, but does not incorporate subjects’ expectations
about future prices. To do so, we now extend “potential losses” slightly. Note that the maximum
capital gain i can expect based on his/her price forecasts and submitted buy order in period t is
maxp>t(f it,p,r − pdit,r +FVt −FVp). Here FVt −FVp is included to account for the difference in the
fundamental value across periods. Therefore, the maximum potential loss for subject i from buying
a unit of asset above the fundamental value in period t in round r given his/her expectation about
future asset prices, plbit,r, can be defined as
plbit,r ≡ max
(
max
p>t
(pdit,r − f it,p,r + FVp − FVt), 0
)
.
Another way of looking at this expression is that the loss from buying above the fundamental value
in period t, pdit − FVt, can be recovered in the future by, at most, maxp>t(f it,p − FVp), given the
expectation of the subject.
Similarly, the maximum potential loss for subject i from selling a unit of asset below the funda-
mental value in period t in round r given his expectation about future asset prices, plsit,r, can be
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Figure 7: Distribution of PLr (top) and P˜L (bottom) over three rounds. Dashed line: 1H5C (N=51).
Solid line: 6H (N=72). Please note that the scale of the x-axis differs between the top (maximum
1.0) and bottom (maximum 0.5) panels. P -values are based on KS and MW 2-tailed tests. The
within group means of PL and P˜L for 6H are used as independent samples to conduct the statistical
tests.
defined as
plsit,r ≡ max
(
max
p>t
(f it,p,r − psit,r + FVt − FVp), 0
)
.
Again, one way of interpreting this expression is that the loss from selling below the fundamental
value in period t, FVt− psit, can be recovered in the future, at most, maxp>t(FVp− f it,p), by buying
the asset back more cheaply in the future.
Based on the above, belief adjusted potential losses, normalized by the value of the initial en-
dowments, for subject i in round r can be defined as
P˜L
i
r ≡
1
1000
∑
t
(
dit,rplb
i
t,r + s
i
t,rpls
i
t,r
)
.
The measure of belief adjusted potential losses, therefore, captures the degree of boundedly rational
behavior given one’s subjective belief.
Figure 7 shows the empirical distribution of PLir (top) and P˜L
i
r (bottom) for rounds 1 (left), 2
(middle), and 3 (right) in the 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C (dashed lines) treatments. It is clear from
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Figure 8: Distributions of PLir for subjects with CRT score 3 (solid lines) and CRT score less than
or equal to 1 (dashed lines) in rounds 1 (left), 2 (middle), and 3 (right) of 6H (top) and 1H5C
(bottom). For the 6H treatment, we used the average of the subjects in the same market as an
independent sample when conducting the statistical tests.
the top panel (distribution of PLir) that subjects in the 1H5C treatment submitted orders that were
potentially less damaging than those in the 6H treatment. With increasing rounds, we see that the
fraction of subjects who submitted potentially loss generating orders decreases in both treatments,
and for those that continued submitting such orders, the magnitude of the potential loss decreases.
If the price forecasts are taken into account, the magnitude of the potential loss decreases.36 In
addition, we see that the distributions of P˜L
i
r for 1H5C are to the left of those for 6H. This is simply
due to the fact that subjects in the 1H5C treatment quickly learnt to forecast prices that follow the
fundamental values. It should, however, be noted that even adjusting for their price forecasts, there
were more than 40% (30%) of the subjects in 1H5C (in 6H) who submitted orders that could result
in losses in round 1. As the number of rounds increases, this fraction decreases, although it remains
non-negligible (more than 20% of the subjects) even in round 3.
Do subjects with high and low CRT scores submit similar orders? Here we focus on “potential
losses,” PL. Figure 8 shows the distributions of PLi over three rounds for the two treatments (6H
at the top and 1H5C at the bottom) for subjects with CRT scores 0 or 1 (dashed lines) and 3 (solid
36Please note that the scale of the x-axis is different for the subfigures for PLir (top) andgPLir (bottom) in Figure 7.
22
lines). In round 1 (leftmost graph), for both treatments, the distribution of PLi for those with low
CRT scores lies to the right of that for subjects with a perfect CRT score and the differences are
statistically significant. This is in line with the finding by Corgnet et al. (2013) that subjects with
lower CRT scores tend to trade at prices that can result in losses.
In round 2 (middle graph), the difference is insignificant for both the 1H5C and 6H treatments
and remains so in round 3 (rightmost graph) for the 6H treatment. While we do not have a good
explanation for the significant difference in the distribution of PLi in round 3 for 1H5C, it may be due
to some subjects trying to see whether they can manipulate the prices by submitting large numbers
of buy orders at a price above the fundamental value. Of course, if they succeed in manipulating
the price in this way, they will make a loss in the 1H5C market.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated to what extent the deviations of price forecasts from the fundamental
values in experimental asset markets are caused by individual bounded rationality (or confusion)
and by strategic uncertainty (uncertainty about others behavior) to better understand the source
of mis-pricing in these experimental markets. We investigated this by comparing the initial, as well
as subsequent, price forecasts submitted by subjects in two market environments - one in which
all six traders were human subjects (6H), and the other where one human subject interacted with
five computer traders submitting orders at the fundamental values (1H5C). Subjects in the 1H5C
treatment were all told that the computer traders submitted orders at the fundamental values. All
the subjects were also clearly informed about the composition of traders in their group. Our analysis
shows that about 50% of the median initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values is due
to some kind of individual bounded rationality and the remaining 50% to strategic uncertainty. We
also found that the effect of strategic uncertainty is greater for those subjects with a higher cognitive
ability that manifests as a higher score in the CRT (Frederick, 2005). For those with a perfect CRT
score, individual bounded rationality accounts for about 30%, while strategic uncertainty accounts
for the remaining 70% of the median initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values. For
those with CRT scores of 0 or 1, we did not observe any significant effect of strategic uncertainty.
Our results show that both strategic uncertainty and individual bounded rationality (or confu-
sion) have significant power in explaining the initial deviation of price forecasts from the fundamental
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values. While individual bounded rationality (or confusion) clearly plays an important role in caus-
ing prices to deviate from the fundamental values in these experimental asset markets as recently
emphasized by Huber and Kirchler (2012) and Kirchler et al. (2012), so too does strategic uncer-
tainty as conjectured by Smith et al. (1988). Subjects being confused cannot be the whole story
behind the bubble.
Our finding complements the recent finding by Cheung et al. (2012) who reported that reducing
individual confusion alone cannot account for the observed mis-pricing, although the lack of common
knowledge of how well everyone understands the nature of the experiment (i.e., the fundamental
values) can. It is interesting to think about the difference in the magnitude of the effect of strategic
uncertainty in our result and that in Cheung et al. (2012). Our result, which is based on initial price
forecasts, shows that strategic uncertainty plays a major role, but cannot account for all the initial
deviations of price forecasts from the fundamental values. On the other hand, Cheung et al. (2012)
showed that, based on the realized prices, the lack of common knowledge of understanding of the
nature of the fundamental values accounts for most of the price deviations from the fundamental
values. One may speculate that the effect of strategic uncertainty we identified is possibly amplified
by trading owing to the presence of strategic complementarity or positive feedback in these markets.
While this is a very interesting and plausible hypothesis, a different set of experiments would need
to be carried out to test it. We leave this to future research.
Let us make another remark before closing the paper. It is quite well known that experiences
in trading in the same market environment help subjects “learn” to trade at prices closer to the
fundamental values and to forecast prices to do so. Haruvy et al. (2007) reported that this dynamic
is due to subjects adjusting their expectation adaptively, i.e., based on the pattern of price changes
observed in the previous rounds and in previous periods in the same round. However, it is not clear
why these subjects adjust their forecasts in this manner. For example, do subjects in 1H5C realize
that prices follow the fundamental values because of the way the five computer traders behave?
If this is the case, what kind of price dynamics will they expect when these experienced subjects
are recruited back to the experiment and are told that they will be in the same market with five
subjects who have never participated in similar experiments (i.e., inexperienced subjects)? If the
subjects with experience in 1H5C understood the effect of the behavior of the computer traders
on the prices, and expected inexperienced subjects to behave quite differently from the computer
traders, they would expect the prices to deviate substantially from the fundamental values.
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The forecasts as well as the behavior of experienced subjects are of interest in the light of findings
by Dufwenberg et al. (2005) and Hussam et al. (2008). Dufwenberg et al. (2005) considered an asset
market with six traders and mixed two (four) subjects with experience of the same market condition
three times with four (two) inexperienced subjects to see whether the presence of inexperienced
subjects caused the prices to deviate more from the fundamental values than in the markets consisting
only of subjects who had experienced the same market twice. A surprising finding is the lack of
a significant difference between the magnitudes of price deviations in the two kinds of markets.
Hussam et al. (2008) allowed subjects to trade in one market condition twice and then changed the
market condition quite drastically by increasing the variance of the distribution of possible dividend
payments as well as the cash/asset ratio in the endowment. While subjects learnt to trade at prices
close to the fundamental values after two iterations in the first market environment, under the
new market condition, the prices once again deviated substantially from the fundamental values.
What these studies leave us to ponder on is: (1) whether experienced subjects learn something
fundamental about the experiment in the first few rounds or whether they just respond to prices
they have observed without thinking much about the reason for observing such prices, and (2) how
experienced subjects expect others to behave in the face of a new condition. By recruiting subjects
who have obtained experience in the 1H5C or 6H treatment and placing them in a market with
inexperienced subjects or in a market with quite different fundamental values and endowments, we
may be able to shed some light on these questions. This remains to be investigated in future research.
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A Table of fundamental values given to the subjects
No. of remaining periods Dividend Next value
At the end of period 1 9 12 108
At the end of period 2 8 12 96
At the end of period 3 7 12 84
At the end of period 4 6 12 72
At the end of period 5 5 12 60
At the end of period 6 4 12 48
At the end of period 7 3 12 36
At the end of period 8 2 12 24
At the end of period 9 1 12 12
At the end of period 10 0 12 0
Next value before the beginning of period 1 is 120.
The value of stock is zero after the final dividend payment in period 10.
B Instructions
English translations of the instructions, the script and the slides shown, can be downloaded from:
• http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/˜nobi/assetM2/slide6Hv2.pdf (slides for 6H)
• http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/˜nobi/assetM2/slide1H5Cv2.pdf (slides for 1H5C)
• http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/˜nobi/assetM2/instructionText2.pdf (script read)
The set of instructions in Japanese is available upon request.
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Treatment N CRTS=0 CRTS=1 CRTS=2 CRTS=3
6H 72 8 17 26 21
1H5C (May 26th and June 2nd) 50 4 9 12 25
1H5C (July 7th) 51 4 10 14 23
Table 3: CRT scores
Distribution of RAFDi1,1 Distribution of RFDi1,1
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 RAFD
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1.0
CDF
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1.0
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p = 0.488(KS) p = 0.010(KS)
p = 0.661(MW ) p = 0.010(MW )
Figure 9: Distributions RAFD1,1 and RFD1,1 for 1H5C using data from sessions on May 26th and
June 2nd (dashed lines) and on July 7th (solid lines).
C Analysis of initial forecasts deviation using only data from
July 7th
In this Appendix, we first discuss the comparison between the initial forecasts deviation in 1H5C
for the May 26th and June 2nd sessions and the July 7th session. We then report the results
from comparing the initial forecasts deviation between the 1H5C and 6H treatments by discarding
the data for 1H5C from the May 26th and June 2nd sessions in which subjects were not grouped
correctly. Table 3 shows the distribution of CRT scores for this restricted set of subjects.
As noted in footnote 24, there is no reason for us to expect the distribution of the initial forecasts
deviation in 1H5C to differ across sessions because the instructions were identical. However, as shown
in Figure 9, it turns out that the distributions of RFD1,1 (left panel) are significantly different for the
May-June sessions (dashed lines) and the July sessions (solid lines). The distribution of RAFD1,1
(right panel), on the other hand, does not differ significantly between these two sessions. This
difference may be due to the difference in the composition of subjects in the two sessions. While
only 10 of the 50 subjects in the May-June sessions were students of engineering related colleges, 37
of the total 51 in the July sessions were students from these colleges.37 Given the between subject
37In the 6H treatments, 31 of the 72 subjects were from engineering related colleges.
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Figure 10: Distributions of initial forecasts deviation from the fundamental values RAFD1,1 and
RFD1,1 (period 1, round 1) in 1H5C (dashed lines, N=51) and 6H (solid lines, N=72). The p-values
are given for 2-tailed KS and MW tests.
nature of the experiment, we decided to pool the data in analyzing the initial forecasts deviation
reported in the main text because results based on a larger number of observations tend to be more
reliable.
Let us now proceed with analyzing the comparison of the initial forecasts deviation for the 6H
and 1H5C treatments using only the data from July 7th for 1H5C. Figure 10 shows the distributions
of RADF i1,1 (left) and RFDi1,1 (right) for 1H5C (dashed lines) and 6H (solid lines). As reported in
the main text, the two distributions are statistically significantly different. The median RADF i1,1
is 0.583 for 6H and 0.303 for 1H5C. Thus, roughly 52% of the initial forecasts deviation is due to
bounded rationality (or confusion) and the remaining 48 % to strategic uncertainty.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of RAFD1,1 (top) and RFD1,1 (bottom) for 6H (solid lines)
and 1H5C (dashed lines) treatments for subjects with CRT score 0 or 1 (left), CRT score 2 (middle),
and CRT score 3 (right). As in the main text, the distributions of RADF i1,1 for the two treatments
are not significantly different for subjects with low CRT scores. However, they are significantly
different for subjects with CRT score 3 according to the KS test (but not the MW test). The
median RADF i1,1 for those with CRT score 3 is 0.570 for 6H and 0.182 for 1H5C. Thus, as reported
in the main text, about 32% of the initial forecasts deviation is due to individual bounded rationality
and the remaining 68% to strategic uncertainty for these subjects.
What is observed from this restricted sample and not when pooling the data, is a significant
difference in the distributions of RFD1,1 (shown in the bottom panel). In the bottom-left and
bottom-middle panels of Figure 2, the dashed curves (for 1H5C) lie to the right of the solid curves
(for 6H). This is the same tendency observed when comparing the May-June sessions of 1H5C and
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Figure 11: Distribution of RAFD1,1 (top) and RFD1,1 (bottom) for 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C
(dashed lines) for subjects with CRT score 0 or 1 (left), CRT score 2 (middle), and CRT score 3
(right).
the July sessions of 1H5C in Figure 9.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the distributions of RAFD1,1 for subjects with CRT score 3 (solid line)
and CRT score 1 or less (dashed line) for the 1H5C treatment using our restricted sample. The
main difference from what was reported in the main text is that for this restricted sample, the two
distributions of RAFD1,1 are much more similar to each other.
1H5C
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 RAFD
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
p = 0.520 (KS) and p = 0.672 (MW)
Figure 12: Distributions of RAFD1,1 for subjects with CRT score 3 (solid line) and CRT score 1 or
less (dashed line) for the restricted sample from the 1H5C treatment.
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